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ABSTRACT

In an era of diminishing privacy, the Internet of Things ("loT") has
become a consensual and inadvertent tool that undermines privacy protection.
The loT, really systems of networks connected to each other by the Internet or
other radio-type device, creates consensual mass self-surveillance in such
domains as fitness and the Fitbit, health care and heart monitors, "smart" houses
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and cars, and even "smart" cities. The multiple networks also have created a
degree of interconnectivity that has opened up a fire hose of information for
companies and governments alike, as well as making it virtually insuperable to
live "off the grid" in the modem era. This treasure trove of information allows
for government tracking in unprecedented ways. This Article explores the
influence of the JoT, the mass self-surveillance it produces on privacy, and the
new shapes of privacy that are emerging as a result. This Article offers several
forms of protection against the further dissipation of privacy.
We have met the enemy, and he is us.
-Theunis Bates1
I.

INTRODUCTION

We live in a world of diminishing privacy. Walls and doors once
protected our personal secrets from governments as well as nosy neighbors.
Today, our hyper cyber-connected life has created ocean-sized data flows, a
potent information marketplace, and public revelation of personal and even
intimate secrets, some usually reserved in the past only for individual diaries or
discussions behind closed doors. If a person lives "on the grid," her intimate and
valued information sooner or later likely will be subject to access to third
parties-and possibly to the eventual sale or distribution of that information to
others far downstream of its intended disclosure. Significantly, big chunks of this
information can end up in government hands, to be stored indefinitely and used
without oversight.2 Governments are collaborating with companies, other
countries, and individuals to obtain information, in addition to accessing
information about individuals directly.
The rise of self-cybersurveillance, meaning the intentional or consensual
creation of mass information about oneself through electronic tracking or other
means, has not only changed daily life for millions of individuals, but also the
nature of personal privacy. One significant stimulus promoting massive data
creation, collection, and transfer is what has been loosely described as the IoT.3
The IoT, more aptly described as an aggregation of systems of networks
connected to each other by the Internet or other radio-type device, creates
consensual mass self-surveillance in such domains as fitness and the Fitbit,4

2

Theunis Bates, Editor'sLetter, THE WK., Jan. 13, 2017, at 3.
See Niva Elkin-Koren & Eldar Haber, Governance by Proxy: Cyber Challenges to Civil

Liberties, 82
3

BROOK.

L. REV. 105 (2016).

Sharon O'Malley, 'Internetof Things'Front and Center at Annual Consumer
Electronics

Show, CONSTRUCTION DIVE (Jan. 16, 2015), http://www.constructiondive.com/news/intemet-of
things-front-and-center-at-annual-consuner-electronics-show/353352/ (explaining that "[t]echies
call the smart home of the future 'the Internet of Things,"' which "can be controlled by the
homeowner using a smartphone application").
4
See FITBIT, http://www.fitbit.com/#i. lr2ovyecs6fall (last visited Mar. 24, 2017).
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health care and heart monitors, "smart" houses 5 and cars, and even "smart"
cities.6 The IoT networks are really an outgrowth of the development of
pervasive computing, which has blurred the boundaries of the digital and
physical worlds. These networks have created a degree of interconnectivity that
has opened up a fire hose of information for individuals, companies, and
governments, as well as made it virtually insuperable to live "off the grid" within
society.7 This treasure trove of information allows for government tracking in
unprecedented ways.
This Article explores the influence of the IoT on privacy, particularly the
mass self-surveillance it produces and the new shapes of privacy that are
emerging as a result. The impact on privacy has been profound, leading privacy
to become a shapeshifter, or transmogrified, especially under the Fourth
Amendment and its protection of that which falls within a "reasonable
expectation of privacy." 8 To protect against the uncontrolled transmogrification
of privacy in the future, safeguards must be made that are structural and not
merely ad hoc.
Different steps can be taken to enhance privacy safeguards, many of
which are interrelated. 9 One step involves constitutional interpretation. The
Fourth Amendment ought to be interpreted to recognize the prevalence and
importance of limited purpose disclosures, much like the idea of privileges used
to promote certain relationships. Another step is rooted in contracts and property
law. The disclosure of information gathered by websites and other IoT devices
cannot simply be based on a clicked consent, but rather as a license to allow a
digitized component of physical property to be shared with a manufacturer or
specified third parties. In this way, the IoT should not be allowed to create free
information as a by-product of its structure, but rather implicit licenses of
information.
Yet another step involves stronger cultural privacy norms. If the legal
limitations of disclosure continue, norms must arise that encourage citizens to be
more vigilant about the nature and types of information voluntarily distributed to
others.

5

See Smart Home, WAREABLE, https://www.wareable.com/smart-home (last visited Mar. 24,

2017).
See Saraju P. Mohanty et al., Everything You Wanted to Know About Smart Cities, IEE
60,
at
2016,
July
MAG.,
ELECTRONICS
CONSUMER
http://www.smohanty.org/PublicationsJournals/2016/MohantyIEEE-CEM_2016-July-SmartCities.pdf
7
See Stephen E. Henderson, A Rose by Any OtherName: Regulating Law Enforcement Bulk
MetadataCollection, 94 TEX. L. REv. 28 (2016).
6

8

concurring).
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (Harlan, J.,

9
See Anita L. Allen, ProtectingOne's Own Privacy in a Big Data Economy, 130 HARV. L.
REv. FORUM 71 (2016).
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A different step puts pressure on commercial enterprises through the
doctrine of interest convergence. This doctrine claims that outcomes often
depend on an alignment of interests that overcomes significant difference in
individuals or groups. One illustration of this occurred in the 2015 Apple-U.S.
Government stand-off, when Apple refused to provide government access to the
locked cell phone of an American terrorist1 ° possibly because of how consumers
and other governments would react if they did. In addition, greater use of
encryption, despite the potential of "going dark,"11 can readily promote
12
individual privacy interests.
Even if these changes suffice, government regulation will still be needed
to ensure a modicum of transparency about the scope of government programs,
including how and when companies are cooperating with the government in
providing information. This assurance of transparency is necessary to ensure that
checks and balances are in place consonant with democracy.
II. THE INTERNET OF THINGS
The ...first 20-odd years of the web have been focused on

human beings. The next era is going to be inanimate things.
13
-Julianna Pepitone
The loT is larger and more organic in actuality than just things connected
to the Internet. While a central IoT component consists of a group of devices
connected to the Internet through local Internet Protocol ("IP") addresses,' 4 that
conceptualization does not accurately portray its true scope. The IoT is more
properly described as groups of devices connected to networks for a particular
reason. While some loT networks link to the Internet, not all do-or need to do
so--to function within their domains. 15 Furthermore, wherever a sensor can be
embedded to first collect and then transmit data, the IoT can be found-even if
10
See Shara Tibken, Feds Get Data Off Terrorist's iPhone Without Apple's Help, CNET (Mar.
28, 2016, 2:59 PM), https://www.cnet.com/news/feds-unlock-iphone-5c-used-by-san-bemardinoterrorist-dont-need-apple/.
11 See Steven B. Taylor, Can You Keep A Secret?: Some Wish to Ban Encryption Technology
for Fearsof Data "Going Dark", 19 SMU ScI. & TECH. L. REv. 215 (2016).
12 See Encryption: Why It Matters, BSA: THE SOFTWARE ALLIANCE, http://encryption.bsa.org/
(last visited Mar. 24, 2017).
13 Google House: Tech Giant Spends Billions to Get Inside Your Home, CNBC: TECH. (Jan.
15, 2014, 6:11 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/2014/01/15/google-house-tech-giant-spends-billionsto-get-inside-your-home.html.
14 These addresses are composed of 32 bytes expressed as four groups of numbers separated
by periods. For example, 356.202.413.100 might be one IP address.
15 Leo Mirani, The "Internet of Things" May Not Always Need an Internet Connection,
QUARTZ (July 1, 2014), https://qz.com/ 2 28750/the-intemet-of-things-may-not-need-an-intemet_
connection/.
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the device is not measuring a thing, but rather an intangible, like the wind,
temperature or how well someone is sleeping.
The use of embedded sensors in networks is proliferating, with a billion
connected devices expected by the year 2020.16 In fact, the growth of the IoT is
occurring at a "dangerously fast pace,"' 7 leading to estimates of more than 40
billion devices by the year 2020.'8
A common thread in the IoT firmament is the presence of semiautonomous data-generating sensors. 19 The radio-transmitting sensors in the
devices generally monitor things with a specific purpose. For example, a smart
thermostat monitors temperature, but it learns to do so at a time when the
temperature really matters, such as when the residents of the home or office are
present.20 A car might have special sensors for its backup camera so the camera
can photograph relevant areas around the car when it is moving, especially in
21
reverse, and a radar system to determine what objects are nearby. These
features are automated to a large extent, allowing some devices to operate
remotely.
The sensors are connected to each other by tiny radio transmitters that
form the backbone of IoT networks. These networks, like subway systems,
22
include the Internet and Local Area Networks ("LAN"). Often, the transmitter
will connect through Wireless Fidelity (what is commonly called "Wi-Fi"), but
can communicate through less powerful connections such as Bluetooth
transmission.
A key to understanding the devices within the IoT is that they are
generally multifunctional, such that their form and function can be separated. In
other words, they are physical devices with a separate digital function. A smart
watch, for example, offers the time, but also might provide the temperature and
email.23 A smart car transports its occupants, but also can have systems that
collect and transmit data for specific functions, such as automated backup

16

See Ben Dickson, Why 1oT Security Is So Critical, TECHCRUNCH (Oct. 24, 2015),

https://techcrunch.com/2015/10/24/why-iot-security-is-so-critical/.
17

Id.

18

Id.

19 Mikel Choperena, Semi-Autonomous Data Collectionfor the loT, EENEWS EuR. (May 10,
2016), http://www.electronics-eetimes.com/news/semi-autonomous-data-collection-iot.
Meet the Nest Thermostat, NEST, https://nest.com/thermostat/meet-nest-thermostat/ (last
20
visited Mar. 24, 2017).
See, e.g., Richard Stevenson, Long-Distance CarRadar, IEEE SPECTRUM (Sept. 29, 2011,
21
2:05 PM), http://spectrum.ieee.org/transportation/advanced-cars/longdistance-car-radar.
These networks use special ways to communicate. The most common one today is the
22
Transmission Control Protocol/Interet Protocol ("TCP/IP").
See Chris Hall, Tissot Is the Latest Swiss Watch Company to Reveal Smartwatch Plans,
23
POCKET-LINT (Mar. 17, 2016), http://www.pocket-lint.com/news/1 37086-tissot-is-the-latest-swisswatch-company-to-reveal-smartwatch-plans.
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cameras, radar detection, and brake sensors.24 The smart television set not only
provides programming, but can be triggered remotely by commands from voice
activation.
Conceptualizing the loT as one contiguous whole also misses the
specific functional purposes of the networks. The nature and scope of the
connected devices often depend on a particular industry or commercial domain
within which the devices operate. In essence, the devices are purposed within the
context of the setting and are automated or set to collect and transmit data for a
specific reason. That is why there are different types of interconnectivity within
the home (such as for appliances and lights), cars (such as for location and
brakes), clothing (such as for location and condition), medicine (for heart rate
and exercise), unmanned aircraft (drones), armaments (weaponry, such as
planes), businesses, and even cities (for electric grids and security). That is also
why the description, "Internet of Everything, '26 misses the import of the domainspecific significance of loT spheres.
In effect, the term "Internet of Things" is a proxy for a conceptualization
of the way devices can communicate and connect with each other to accumulate,

24

See generally Jeff Bertolucci, Big Data Drives the Smart Car, INFORMATIONWEEK (Mar.

18, 2014, 10:12 AM), http://www.informationweek.com/big-data/big-data-analytics/big-datadrives-the-smart-car/d/d-id/1 127767; Josh Caplan, Self-Driving Google Cars Will Have Built in
Police Radar Detectors, So You'll Never Get Pulled Over Ever Again, VESSEL NEWS,
http://vesselnews.io/self-driving-google-cars-will-built-radar-detectors-youll-never-get-pulledever/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2017).
25
See, e.g., Not In Front of the Telly: Warning Over "Listening" TV, BBC NEWS (Feb. 9,
2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-31296188. As stated in the article:
The policy explains that the TV set will be listening to people in the same room
to try to spot when commands or queries are issued via the remote. It goes on
to say: "If your spoken words include personal or other sensitive information,
that information will be among the data captured and transmitted to a third
party."
Id.
26
See John Chambers, Are You Readyfor the Internet of Everything?, WORLD ECON. F. (Jan.
15,
2014),
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2014/01/are-you-ready-for-the-internet-ofeverything/.
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sort, and transmit data.27 Perhaps the most that can be said about pinning down
an exacting scope of the JoT is that its definition is evolving.2 8
III. THE NEW SELF-CYBERSURVEILLANCE AND THE lOT

Perhaps the overriding consequence of the IoT's interconnecting devices
is to create multiple systems of not just mass surveillance, but massive
surveillance. These self-surveillance systems have different levels of breadth and
depth-some systems are micro-based, such as how active a person is who wears
a cyberonic device like a FitBit, and some are macro-based, such as monitoring
an area of a city for electricity consumption, traffic patterns, and criminal
activity. 29 The micro-oriented surveillance often becomes a component of larger
systems. The heart-tracker, for example, joins with a blood pressure evaluation,
a sleep assessor, and a step measurer 30 to create a better gage of personal health.
A single individual's information, in turn, can be accessed, aggregated-even
anonymized-and sorted by health companies or insurers to predict health trends
and create more efficiencies in their businesses.
The information generated by the transmitting devices can be readily
shared with application developers, manufacturers, and other interested third
parties. 3 1 The commodification of such information has been occurring without
much regulation for more than a decade. Significantly, the data trail often is
invisible. Unlike a police tail or cameras fixed on buildings, even the surveillance
from the interconnected devices lies submerged and generally does not create the
experience of intrusion or intervention. The data transmission may cause little

27
See, e.g., Jacob Morgan, A Simple Explanationof "The Internet of Things ", FORBES (May
13, 2014, 12:05 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jacobmorgan/2014/05/13/simple-explanationintemet-things-that-anyone-can-understand/#605a9f096828. Morgan stated:
Simply put, this is the concept of basically connecting any device with an on
and off switch to the Internet (and/or to each other). This includes everything
from cellphones, coffee makers, washing machines, headphones, lamps,
wearable devices and almost anything else you can think of. This also applies
to components of machines, for example a jet engine of an airplane or the drill
of an oil rig.
Id.
See generally ROBERTO MINERVA ET AL., TOwARDS A DEFINITION OF THE INTERNET OF
28
THINGS (IoT) (2015), http://iot.ieee.org/images/files/pdf/IEEE loTTowardsDefinitionInternet
of ThingsRevisionl_27MAY15.pdf
See, e.g., Jacob Betzner, Surveillance Society: Wearable Fitness Devices Often Carry
29

Security Risks, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Aug. 3, 2015,

12:00 AM), http://www.post-

gazette.com/news/surveillance-society/2015/08/03/Surveillance-Society-Wearable-fitnessdevices-often-carry-security-risks/stories/201508030023.
See generally Withings Pulse O, WITHINGS, http://www.withings.com/us/en/products/pulse
30
(last visited Mar. 24, 2017). The device tracks heart rate, oxygen, and sleep. Id.
Most manufacturers will be able to share user information.
31
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fear precisely because the potential harms from shared information are unseen
and often surface far downstream.32
Another salient feature of the IoT surveillance systems is that they are
generally voluntary, initiated with the express or implicit consent of the
surveilled. That is, the subjects either initiate surveillance (e.g., put on wearable
tech or buy a smart television) or consent to surveillance (e.g., html cookies
deposited in websites). The information starts flowing by being consensually
shared with the application maker or software manufacturer, and then often finds
its way into the broader information marketplace. The information stream can
then move readily from within the industry domain to the government.
While this flow of information is often understated or hidden, that is not
always the case. Sometimes, the notice of data collection and transfer is clearly
asserted. One example is the website thenextweb.com ("TNW").33 Prominently
featured on the Web page is a video vine of a person eating a real cookie, with
the statement underneath: "TNW uses cookies to personalize content and ads to
make our site easier for you to use. We do also share that information with third
parties for advertising and analytics. ' 34 While this pronouncement likely does
not deter users from accessing the site, it does show that the information stream
goes to unknown sources.
IV. HOW THE SELF-CYBERSURVEILLANCE OF THE IoT
HAS LOOSENED THE MOORINGS OF PHYSICAL WORLD PRIVACY
A. Start with the Internet's Business Foundation-Surveillance
Several important complicating factors have hastened the shapeshifting
of privacy. One significant precursor to the IoT was the business model that
evolved to commoditize the Internet. Instead of being premised on a system of
pay for use, the Internet monetized advertising. It was not just ads that were the
cornerstone of the economic structure, but by making users the product, it
focused on the surveillance of the users. In essence, surveillance was the key to
the profitability of the World Wide Web. Ethan Zimmerman, one of the creators
of the "pop-up" advertisement on the web, has written an insightful reflection of
where good intentions to develop the web in a certain way may have gone awry:
See, e.g., Michael S. Schmidt & Michael D. Shear, Drones Spotted, but Not Halted,Raise
Concerns, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/30/us/for-super-bowland-big-games-drone-flyovers-are-rising-concem.html.
32

Compare these interconnected devices with unmanned aerial devices, or drones. The drones can
often be seen and heard, providing the experience of intrusion. Drones, without a pilot, are perhaps
even more intrusive because you can see them but not their "pilot." These drones are operated
commercially and privately and often provide a danger to those in the sky and on the ground-but
in a very different way than the IoT.
33
THENEXTWEB, http://thenextweb.com (last visited Mar. 24, 2017).
34
Id.
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I have come to believe that advertising is the original sin of
the web. The fallen state of our Internet is a direct, if
unintentional, consequence of choosing advertising as the
default model to support online content and services. Through
successive rounds of innovation ... we've trained Internet users
to expect that everything they say and do online will be
aggregated into profiles (which they cannot review, challenge,
or change) that shape both what ads and what content they see.
Outrage over experimental manipulation of these profiles by
social networks and dating companies has led to heated debates
amongst the technologically savvy, but hasn't shrunk the user
bases of these services, as users now accept that this sort of
manipulation is an integral part of the online experience.
Users have been so well trained to expect surveillance that
even when widespread, clandestine government surveillance
was revealed by a whistleblower, there has been little organized,
public demand for reform and change.... It's unlikely that our
willingness to accept online surveillance reflects our trust in the
American government .... More likely, we've been taught that
this is simply how the Internet works: If we open ourselves to
ever-increasing surveillance-whether from corporations or
governments-the tools and content we want will remain free of
cost.

35

What Mr. Zimmerman is effectively observing is that the reasonable
expectations of online users now include manipulation and tracking. If this
notion of expectations shaped by culture and technology prevails, privacy will
exist only in fractional parts, becoming part social choice-whether to
participate in common social groups, such as Facebook and Instagram -and
more secure methods of communication, such as
whether to find alternative,
36 or WhatsApp. 37
Signal

35

Ethan

Zuckerman,

The

Internet's

Original Sin,

ATLANTIC

(Aug.

14,

2014),

https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/08/advertising-is-the-intemets-originalsin/376041/.
See Micah Lee, You Should Really ConsiderInstallingSignal, an EncryptedMessaging App
36
for iPhone, INTERCEPT (Mar. 2, 2015, 1:04 PM), https://theintercept.com/2015/03/02/signaliphones-encrypted-messaging-app-now-supports-text/.
37
WHATSAPP, http://www.whatsapp.com (last visited Mar. 24, 2017).
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B. The Pervasivenessand Insecurity of the JoT

1. Pervasiveness
The idea of pervasive computing, where the digital invades the physical
world, has become a reality with the IoT.3 8 The result is a transformative
experience, as well as a surfeit of data. 39 The amount of data that can be generated
by the IoT is voluminous, even by digital era standards. A Federal Trade
Commission report found that fewer than 10,000 homes can generate up to 150
million data points per day.4 ° With such loads of information generated every
day, entry points for hackers and third parties in general are exponential in
number.41
It is not just the volume of the IoT data that can make users wary.
Information generated by self-surveillance can be permissibly accessed in ways
unimaginable just decades ago. While often unseen, the new systems are firmly
entrenched in a rapidly changing world. Within the new systems are various
access points that are accessible by consent--or in the current culture of
technology, hacking. As one commentator noted:
We let Facebook and Google scour our private messages, photos
and search queries so they can better tailor advertising to us. Our
GPS-enabled smartphones allow Apple and other companies to
track our location and movements. And now millions of people
are installing always-listening smart speakers in their
homes... In theory, smart speakers record only those
commands [directed to them], and everything else they hear is
deleted. But hackers have already cracked into Wi-Fi baby
monitors and it seems inevitable that an enterprising cybercriminal ... will figure out how to eavesdrop through these

gadgets.4 2

38
See generally Jerry Kang & Dana Cuff, Pervasive Computing: Embedding the Public
Sphere, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 93 (2005).
39
40

Id.
FED. TRADE COMM'N, INTERNET OF THINGS: PRIVACY & SECURITY IN A CONNECTED WORLD

14 (2015), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-staffreport-november-2013-workshop-entitled-intemet-things-privacy/1 50127iotrpt.pdf.
41

Andrew Meola, How the Internet of Things Will Affect Security & Privacy, Bus. INSIDER

(Dec. 19, 2016, 2:43 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/internet-of-things-security-privacy2016-8.
42

Bates, supra note 1.
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The prevalence of surveillance, particularly when contrasted with security
interests, 43 can be illustrated by developments in each wave of technology. Three
such examples in the current wave are the "Beware" program by Intrado, Clear
Channel Outdoor's smart billboards, and smart athletic shirts.
Intrado, a subsidiary of the West Corporation, manufactures proprietary
commercial software called Beware, which assigns "threat scores" to local
residents.44 While the information utilized is not all from the loT, much of it is
self-created by voluntary actions available to the public. According to the
company's website:
Beware uses a patent-pending, web-search algorithm to scan
massive amounts of commercial data and presents it as
actionable intelligence, complete with threat scores in an easyto-read headline format-all within seconds of an initial
query.45
The scores created by the software are red, yellow, or green, depending on the
algorithm's conclusions. 46 The software sifts information from commercial data
brokers that include publicly available records-arrests and conviction records,
health history, property and commercial databases, and social media postings.
The software can sort billions of data points in seconds.47 The tool currently is
being used by the Fresno, California, Police Department,4 8 with more
departments likely to 'follow if the program is successful. According to the
company that makes the software, "Beware is a tool built to help public safety
agencies inform first responders about the environment they may encounter
when responding to a 9-1-1 call."49
The Beware program illustrates the importance of information
transparency to privacy and provides ample evidence of the problems attendant
to surveillance without oversight or checks and balances. The use of propensity-

43
and

See generally Hayley Tsukayama, Amazon CEO Jeffrey Bezos: Debate Between Privacy
WASH.
POST
(May
18,
2016),
"Issue of Our Age",
Security Is

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2016/05/18/amazon-ceo-jeffrey-bezosdebate-between-privacy-and-security-is-issue-of-our-age/?utm term=.e6c91353 869c.
44 Alicia Marie Tan, A CaliforniaPolice DepartmentDecides How Dangerous You Are Using
This Software, MASHABLE (Jan.
beware/#VqU4VPojZqb.

15, 2016), http://mashable.com/2016/01/15/fresno-police-

45

Id.

46

See Ms. Smith, Beware: Surveillance Software Police are Using to Score Citizens' Threat

Level,

NETWORKWORLD

(Jan.

11,

2016,

10:37

AM),

http://www.networkworld.com/article/3020669/security/beware-surveillance-software-policeare-using-to-score-citizens-threat-level.html.

47

Tan, supra note 44.

48

Id.

49

Id.
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based analysis triggers many salient questions. What ingredients or information
are used in the Beware algorithm-such as from social media posts and other
public sources? How much came from the IoT, and how is it weighted? Does old
information get discounted or discarded? Is the threat score contextualized to the
situation and others who might be at the scene of a 911 call? If the formula is a
trade secret, as claimed, how does anyone know if it is discriminatory or simply
another form of profiling? Also, when and how often does a rigorous review of
the accuracy and reliability of the algorithm's scientific theory occur?
These and other questions will persist, especially as such programs
continue to operate in secret, while propensity to behave in certain ways becomes
an increasingly marketable commodity. The questions show that propensity
analysis often might disrupt settled expectations of privacy. The issues with
Beware also show that the disclosure of information is not about the first receiver
of it, but where it might end up-in a program such as Beware and the
government, or in many other locations.
Another significant illustration of propensity-based tracking based on
self-produced information involves the largest supplier of outdoor billboards,
Clear Channel Outdoor.50 The company has announced the creation of smart
billboards, using a program called Radar.5 ' These billboards can track the cell
phones possessed by drivers and passengers in the vicinity of the billboards, and
then follow-up and determine whether these individuals have accessed the
website of the company whose ad the billboard was advertising. While not
exactly parallel to the film Minority Report,52 in which a small poster ad
specifically targeted the protagonist, John Anderton, to sell him a particular type
of beverage, it does create a whole new form of performance tracking.
Smart athletic shirts provide another illustration of how the loT will
cause further shapeshifting of privacy.53 Over the past several decades, college
sports departments have entered deals with apparel companies for millions of

http://clearchanneloutdoor.com/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2017).

50

CLEAR CHANNEL OUTDOOR,

5l

See, e.g., Clear Channel Outdoor Americas Launches "RADAR "-New Data Analytics

Solution for Marketers to Plan and Buy Out-of-Home Media and Measure Target Audience
Segment
Outcomes,
Bus.
WIRE
(Feb.
29,
2016,
7:50
AM),
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20160229005959/en/Clear-Channel-OutdoorAmericas-Launches-'RADAR'.
52
MINORITY REPORT (Cruise/Wagner Productions 2002).
53
This dilemma will arise at all levels of sport. Major League Baseball, for example, approved
wearable technology during games in 2016. Mike Vorkunov, Innovation vs. Invasion of Privacy:
MLB Wearable Technology Battle Looms, USA TODAY (Sept. 22, 2016, 12:48 AM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/mlb/2016/09/2 I/innovation-vs-invasion-privacy-mlbwearable-technology-battle-looms/90783188/. Players can wear the Zephyr Bioharness to track
their breathing and heart rate, as well as the Motus Sleeve, which has a chip in it that tracks arm
angles and the forces placed on the ligaments in the elbow from throwing. Id.
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dollars.5 4 In recent years, these deals have taken on a transformative dimension,
providing that the players will be given smart apparel that contains tiny radio
sensors allowing for the collection, transmission, and evaluation of biometric
data. The transfer of such data raises the question of who owns the information
produced. As one commentator noted, wearable technology might be the next
frontier for athletes' rights in big-time college sports.55 At the University of
Michigan, for example, a school that has a contract for wearable technology, this
issue is already emerging. The wearable clothing incorporates different sensors
that can collect an array of data, such as data related to speed, distance, vertical
aloft, shot attempts, length of ball possession, heart
leap, height, maximum time
56
rate, and running routes.
When student-athletes wearing smart apparel start transmitting data to
third parties, a significant question arises as to whether the young athletes will
have any security or privacy protections in their information. Once the
information is released, it will be next to impossible to return it to a "forgotten"
status. While the contract at the University of Michigan apparently states that the
data collection will be anonymous and comply with all of the applicable laws, it
would not be difficult to de-anonymize the data, hack it, or both. The dilemma
of who owns self-generated information is an especially thorny one in this
context and is not readily resolved by existing legal structures. These questions
implicate the pliability and varying contexts of consent, and how important the
definition and application of the rule are to loT issues. Without greater
regulation, understanding, and attention paid to the issue, the greater our
acquiescence to tracking by third parties will be.
2. Insecurity
Insecurity of the loT is a significant impediment to the benefits it offers.
The problems are both perceived and real. One study showed that 44% of the
people polled were "very concerned" that their information would be stolen.57 In
actuality, researchers have demonstrated the ability to hack into many IoT
devices, from stopping cars remotely while they are driven on a highway, to
Samsung's SmartThings smart home platform. 58

54
See, e.g., Kim Broekhuizen, U-M Launches Exercise and Sport Science Initiative, MICH.
NEWS (Sept. 29, 2016), http://ns.umich.edu/new/releases/24230-u-m-launches-exercise-and-sportscience-initiative; Marc Tracy, With Wearable Tech Deals,New PlayerDataIs Up for Grabs,N.Y.
TIEs (Sept. 9, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/11/sports/ncaafootball/wearabletechnology-nike-privacy-college-football.html?_r=0.
55
See Tracy, supra note 54.
56

Id.

57

Meola, supra note 41.
Id.

58
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It is not simply uninvited access by hackers who can take down an entire
power grid.59 The government partners with companies to get access to the
company's information, as what occurred with Yahoo and the United States
government in 2015.60 There are also requests for permission to access
information by companies through long and detailed consent agreements that
often are not read by consumers, or government requests of companies to
disclose. For example, a man was accused of killing a friend in Arkansas in 2016,
and state police subpoenaed the only "eyewitness" to the crime-the interactive
Amazon Echo automated "personal assistant," located in the same room, that was
possibly listening to the incident. 61 The Echo is a free-standing electronic device
that connects to a network through Wi-Fi and can be asked all sorts of
questions-about the weather, news, etc.--or tasked with keeping grocery and
other lists. 62 The Echo "listens" for the special word that activates it for
commands.63 As one journalist asked about the situation, "Namely, is there a
difference in the reasonable expectation of privacy one should have when dealing
with a device that is 'always on' in one's own home? '64 Amazon, like Apple
before it, is refusing to turn over to the police the data it has from the device,
claiming customer privacy as the reason. 65 Yet, other IoT information also might
be pertinent. The government investigators have learned from a smart water
meter on the premises that "an increase in water use in the middle of the night
66
suggests a possible cleanup around the crime scene.

59

Id.

60

Joseph Menn, Exclusive: Yahoo Secretly Scanned Customer Emailsfor U.S. Intelligence-

Sources, REUTERS TECH. NEWS (Oct. 4, 2016, 9:27 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-yahoonsa-exclusive-idUSKCN1241 YT.
61
Amy B. Wang, Can Alexa Help Solve a Murder? Police Think So-But Amazon Won't Give
Up Her Data, WASH. POST (Dec. 28, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theswitch/wp/2016/12/28/can-alexa-help-solve-a-murder-police-think-so-but-amazon-wont-give-upher-data/?utmterm=.60e27c8820d2.
62
Amazon has named its voice assistant the Alexa Voice Service. Amazon Echo, AMAZON,
https://www.amazon.com/gp/product/BOOX4WHP5E?tag=googhydr20&hvadid=88444290302&hvpos= 1t &hvexid=&hvnetw=g&hvrand= 10131446964744482445
&hvpone=&hvptwo=&hvqmt=-e&hvdev=c&ref=pdsl_5bkergO9re-e-yac__yfmrw4 (last visited
Mar. 24, 2017).
63
Wang, supra note 61.
64

Id.

Id.; see also Tsukayama, supra note 43.
Alina Selyukh, As We Leave More Digital Tracks, Amazon Echo Factors In Murder
Investigation,
NPR
(Dec.
28,
2016,
3:20
PM),
http://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2016/12/28/507230487/as-we-leave-more-digitaltracks-amazon-echo-factors-in-murder-investigation.
65
66
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i.

Multiple Weaknesses

A significant problem with IoT sensor networks is the multiple inflection
points that are vulnerable to hacking. The login credentials of many IoT devices,
67
particularly those that are not built with security in mind, are often weak.
Gateways connecting IoT devices to the manufacturing companies are often
insecure.68 Of course, there are vulnerabilities in the devices themselves.
Generally, as one commentator has noted, the devices have "a one-time
authentication process, which can make them perfect sources of infiltration into
company networks., 69 Further, the transmission of information often occurs
70
without encryption, creating opportunities for security breaches. Part of the
problem has been the rapid development of the loT without a concurrent
development in security. Instead, for some of the development of the IoT,
security was treated more as an externality, not as an essential component of the
core part of the IoT system.71
ii.

"Always On "Devices

The expanding "always on" phenomenon of IoT devices is creating
significant issues for privacy. It shows that vulnerabilities created by selfsurveillance are multiplied by "always on" devices and provide extra targets and
opportunities for hacking. Google's Chromium browser, for example, has code
72
that ensnares private communications when a computer's microphone is turned
73
on without permission. Even Mattel's toy doll, "Hello Barbie," has a Wi-Fi
connection and built-in microphone capable of listening to children's

Mahendra Ramsinghani, How the "Insecurityof Things " Creates the Next Wave of Security
Opportunities, TECHCRUNCH (June 26, 2016), https://techcrunch.com/2016/06/26/how-the67

insecurity-°f-thingscreates-the-next'wave'°f-security-°ppormities/.
Dickson, supra note 16.
68
69

Id.

70

Id.

71

Id.

72

Samuel Gibbs, Google Eavesdropping Tool Installed on Computers Without Permission,
2
(June 23, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/ 015/jun/23/google-

GUARDIAN

eavesdropping-tool-installed-computers-without-permission.
73
Letter from Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. to Loretta Lynch, Attorney Gen., and Edith Ramirez,
FTC Chairwoman 2 (July 10, 2015), https://epic.org/privacy/internet/ftc/EPIC-Letter-FTC-AGAlways-On.pdf (citing Rick Falkvinge, Google Chrome Listening in to Your Room Shows the
Importance of Privacy Defense

in Depth, PRIVACY NEWS

ONLINE

(June

18,

2015)

www.privateinternetaccess.com/blog/2015/06/google-chrome-listening-in-to-your-room-showsthe-importance-of-privacy-defense-in-depth/).
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conversations within range to determine a child's "likes and dislikes., 74 It is not
just toy dolls that listen. Microsoft's "always on" voice and motion recorder,
Kinect, has been installed as part of the company's Xbox video game console.75
Of course, Amazon sells its voice activated computer program, Alexa, as a
personal assistant who listens for the activating word, "Alexa. '' 76 Perhaps the
most well-known "always on" device was the Samsung television advertised as
listening in on conversations in the same room as the television-and distributing
some of those conversations to third parties." To compound the disruptive force
of this television feature to privacy, Samsung admitted some of its transmissions
were not encrypted.
As "always on" devices proliferate, it will continue to be unclear as to
what Americans expect devices to record in their homes, and whether standards
will continue to change. The increasing acceptance of these devices, if not the
scope of their snooping, creates new understandings of the sanctity and
inviolability of the American home.78
V. SAFEGUARDING PRIVACY IN AN

1oT WORLD

Safeguarding privacy in an 1oT world will become increasingly difficult,
particularly within the prevailing digital culture of advertising. Right now,
tracking incentivizes the continued commoditization of personal information.
While some form of disclosure may appear to be in alignment with living "on
the grid" in everyday life, privacy issues arise in every stage of information
acquisition by a third party-access, storage, analysis, and use. For example, data
generated by IoT devices, such as cars, health trackers, and home appliances,
could be accessed, saved, and analyzed by life or health insurance companies as
well as governments to make critical forward-looking employment, contract, and
investigative decisions. 79 Hackers will likely desire access to the same data for
monetary or social purposes. With the constraints of living "on the grid" putting
all information at risk of disclosure, even the deepest of secrets could be
obtained, including those occurring within the furthest reaches of the home.8 °

74
Id. (quoting Iain Thomson, Hello Barbie:Hang On, This Wi-Fi Doll Records Your
Child's
Voice?
What
Could Possibly Go
Wrong?,
REGISTER
(Feb.
19,
2015),
www.theregister.co.uk/2015/02/19/hellobarbie/).
75
Id.at 3.
76
Id. at 3-4.
77

Id. at 3.
Id. at 5. "It is unreasonable to expect consumers to monitor their every word in front of their
home electronics. It is also genuinely creepy." Id. (citing 2001: A SPACE ODYSSEY (MGM 1968))
79
Meola, supra note 41.
80
Id. For example, German researchers intercepted unencrypted data from a smart meter and
determined that the occupant was watching television and learned what show was being watched.
78
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Protections for such a porous enterprise as the IoT must be structural and
not ad hoc. Structural protections can direct privacy shapeshifting through at
least four different sources: individuals, companies, the Constitution, and
government legislation. Individuals-and the culture they create-can be more
vigilant about disclosing information and use new developments in technology
to minimize unthinking consent and limit third-party disclosures. Companies can
be held accountable for their collection and transfer of information, especially
partnerships with government, through interest convergence where privacy is
recognized as a legitimate commodity, or the level of company transparency, at
least revealing data deletion, use of encryption, whether devices are always on,
and if so, what information is within the reach of the devices handled.
Further, government regulations can be enacted to provide informational
transparency, both in the collection, storage, and analysis by private companies,
as well as the government. While the government has interests in secrecy when
information is used for crime interdiction, it can still disclose processes and
general outlines of use, such as the scope of government collection, types of use,
and longevity of data government receives. Lastly, the Fourth Amendment can
be interpreted to rein in the Third Party Doctrine in the new information
commodity era, where the coin of the realm is often split-second information
available from halfway around the world. Some of these sources will be more
viable than others in the near future; others will require long-term percolation.
The following subsections will review three of the more likely possibilities: the
Fourth Amendment, a culture of vigilance, and company-consumer alliances.
A.

The FourthAmendment as a Protective Source

In the United States, a focal point for privacy over the past several
decades has been the Fourth Amendment. While the interpretation of reasonable
expectations of privacy has not adapted to the newest technologies, seeds of
change have been planted if the courts decide to revisit established search and
seizure doctrine. Constitutional interpretation can be applied to the loT to ensure
that reasonable expectations of privacy are maintained despite new waves of
technology. Until the Fourth Amendment-or other laws-affords some
protection to self-generated data, however, even if that data is voluntarily
disclosed in a limited fashion, traditional privacy limits as they currently exist
will continue to be ineffective against government intervention. Europe,
Australia, and some other countries are beginning to place limits on the scope
and nature of use of personal information, crafting legislative norms for
informational privacy. 81 Such norms have not been similarly enunciated in the
United States. Thus, the most likely short-term protection of privacy in the

See generally Morgan A. Corley, Note, The Needfor an InternationalConvention on Data
Privacy: Taking a Cue from CISG, 41 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 721 (2016) (discussing the EU and data
privacy).
81
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United States will have to result from judicial action, the marketplace, or
individuals creating a culture of information privacy.
Perhaps the most significant leverage point for protection from
untrammeled privacy shapeshifting revolves around the Third Party Doctrine of
the Fourth Amendment. This doctrine does not provide Fourth Amendment
protection to information voluntarily disclosed to a third party. 2 The doctrine
has effectively swallowed up much of the discussion about the nuances and
intricacies of consent in a digital world. 3
The doctrine still relies on decades-old cases, such as United States v.
Miller, 4 a 1976 case which found that bank records of individuals received no
protection against access by the government under the Fourth Amendment, 5 and
Smith v. Maryland,8 6 a 1979 case that held that pen registers were not within the
privacy protected under the Fourth Amendment.87 The twin pillars of Smith and
Miller have been used to justify many forms of bulk data collection. The cases
have justified the collection of many terabytes of IoT data88 and appear to
legitimize collection by third parties of much of the data that flows through the
IoT as well. The facts of Smith, however, are far removed from justifying bulk
self-surveillance data collection without any prior reasonable suspicion of
criminal behavior justifying the data collection. 89 The net cast by the IoT cannot
be compared to a pen register or paper financial records. The nature and quantity
of information created through the IoT allows for a fundamental shift in the
nature of police activity.
To illustrate, a man in Ohio was recently charged with aggravated arson
and insurance fraud for allegedly burning down his house.9" A key piece of
82

See Orin Kerr & Greg Nojeim, The Data Question: Should the Third-Party Records
Be
Revisited?,
A.B.A.
J.
(Aug.
1,
2012,
9:20
AM),

Doctrine

http://www.abajoumal.com/magazine/article/the-data-question-should the thirdparty-records-doctrine be revisited/.
83 See id.
84

425 U.S. 435 (1976).

See id. at 437 (stating that the motion to suppress concerned checks and other bank records).
86
442 U.S. 735 (1979).
87
See id. at 745 (finding that because there is no legitimate expectation of privacy regarding
the phone numbers citizens dial, the installation of a pen register is not a search within the ambit
of the Fourth Amendment).
88
Joseph D. Momin, Note, NSA Metadata Collection and the Fourth Amendment, 29
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 985, 987 (2014) (explaining that the Government relies on Smith to defend
the constitutionality of its bulk data collection).
89
Bulk data collection can be seen as wholesale, not retail, in that there is no specific
criminality that is motivating the police intrusion.
90
Debra Cassens Weiss, Data on Man's Pacemaker Led to His Arrest on Arson Charges,
A.B.A.
J.
(Feb.
6,
2017,
7:00
AM),
http://www.abajoumal.com/news/article/data-on-mans-pacemakerledtohisarrest-on arson_
charges.
85
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evidence leading to the charge was the information obtained from his pacemaker,
which appeared inconsistent with his claim that he was in the house when it
caught fire, broke the glass of his bedroom window after packing some
belongings, and fled. 91 The examination of the accused's cardiac rhythms and
heart rate at the time of the event, according to a cardiologist, made it "highly
improbable" that someone with the accused's heart condition could do what he
claimed. 92 In this case, the police did get a warrant. But if this information were
on a device supplied to third parties, such a warrant might be superfluous.
Yet, the foundation for a different approach to information disclosed to
third parties was established long ago. Justice Thurgood Marshall, dissenting in
Smith,93 stated, "Privacy is not a discrete commodity, possessed absolutely or not
at all." 94 And as one commentator observed,
[T]he idea that information exposed to others is no longer
private has been oversold. Millions of Americans expect all sorts
of things exposed to third parties remain private under state law.
And as technology advances and the information we give to ISPs
and telcos becomes more and more revealing, even federal
courts are beginning to rethink whether Smith is the absolute
rule the government claims it should be.
On its 35th birthday, Smith's vitality is on the decline, and
that's a good thing.95
That doctrine, based on cases decided decades ago, such as United States v.
Miller,96 does not afford privacy protection to information voluntarily disclosed
to third parties. 97 Through these antecedents, the Third Party Doctrine must be
placed within context of the digital era. 98 While some commentators have
advocated abolishing the Third Party Doctrine, others suggest reforming it. One
way is to allow for limited disclosures, much like privileged information
disclosed to an attorney by a client, a psychotherapist by a patient, or a spouse
by another spouse. The level of disclosures sweeps away the private sphere of

91

Id.

92

Id.

Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
94
Id. at 749 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Hanni Fakhoury, Smith v. Maryland Turns 35, But Its Health Is Declining, ELECTRONIC
95
FRONTIER FOUND. (June 24, 2014), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/06/smith-v-marylandturns-35-its-healths-declining.
425 U.S. 435 (1976).
96
93

See id.
A promising start to adapting Fourth Amendment doctrine to the digital era was Kyllo v.
United States, concerning the police's use of a thermal imaging device on a person's home. 533
U.S. 27 (2001). The case was not utilized as a seminal foundation for further applications to the
waves of technology.
97
98
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intimacy which can be protected by a limited disclosure doctrine-particularly
if it tracks the protections of well-established privileges.
Another way is to adopt the mosaic test evidenced in the concurrences
of Justices Samuel Alito and Sonia Sotomayor in United States v. Jones.99 The
rationale for such a limit was explained by the D.C. Circuit in United States v.
Maynard,100 which observed that long-term surveillance can reveal everything
about a person:
Prolonged surveillance reveals types of information not revealed
by short-term surveillance, such as what a person does
repeatedly, what he does not do, and what he does ensemble.
These types of information can each reveal more about a person
than does any individual trip viewed in isolation. Repeated visits
to a church, a gym, a bar, or a bookie tell a story not told by any
single visit, as does one's not visiting any of these places over
the course of a month. The sequence of a person's movements
can reveal still more; a single trip to a gynecologist's office tells
little about a woman, but that trip followed a few weeks later by
a visit to a baby supply store tells a different story. A person who
knows all of another's travels can deduce whether he is a weekly
church goer, a heavy drinker, a regular at the gym, an unfaithful
husband, an outpatient receiving medical treatment, an associate
of particular individuals or political groups-and not just one
such fact about a person, but all such facts.10 1
Justice Sotomayor also advocated that a limited purpose test be adopted in her
concurrence in Jones.1 02 She wrote:
People disclose the phone numbers that they dial or text to their
cellular providers; the URLs that they visit and the e-mail
addresses with which they correspond to their Internet service
providers; and the books, groceries, and medications they
purchase to online retailers ... I would not assume that all
information voluntarily disclosed to some member of the public
for a limited purpose is, for that reason alone, disentitled to
Fourth Amendment protection."'
Another approach yielding a similar conclusion looks at the value of privacy to
democracy and private individuals. If privacy is a highly valued component of

99

565 U.S. 400 (2012).
615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
101 Id. at 562 (footnote omitted).
102
Jones, 565 U.S. at 417-18 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
103
Id.
too
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personal and democratic life, then, just like equal protection analysis, should
°4
heightened scrutiny be accorded to some privacy analysis?
B. A Culture of Vigilance
While laws and the Constitution can shape behavior, perhaps the most
pragmatic and immediate privacy protection from a rapidly expanding IoT
involves individual action-the creation of a culture of privacy vigilance. The
digital culture, seemingly of ubiquitous interconnectedness and sharing without
regard to downstream consequences, plays an important role in the massive
amounts of data being produced, gathered, and analyzed.
The IoT has exposed the porousness of the current conception of
consent, where a single click can lead to the transfer and commodification of
huge amounts of personal information over a long period of time. Most people
using American websites or apps do not consciously consent to sharing
information without limits, or consciously accept the deposit of company
trackers, called cookies, or authorize the use of that information downstream.
Consequently, traditional legal contours of what counts as acceptable notice
likely will not suffice. Instead of marginal minimums, individuals can demand
some level of transparency regarding what happens to their information. Much
like the common boilerplate offered for the recording of phone calls by
companies, "this call is being monitored for quality control and other purposes,"
typical website or application consent forms have become more like wallpaperbarely noticed and seldom remembered. Individuals can create some movement
in the privacy barometer by at least noticing, and then speaking up.
For many users, the notion of "I have nothing to hide" provides a
rationale for permitting disclosure. 10 5 Yet, the consequences of consent can be
significant and adverse, to the extent that individuals do not realize they do have
something to protect after all. 106 At least initially, individuals should be reticent
to agree to loT tracking-and that is especially important with respect to sharing
that information with third parties. For example, if applications ("apps") ask
permission to have access to contacts, or track individuals even when the app is
not being used, the culture should lean away from consenting to the request.

See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme
Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretationsfrom Chevron to Hamdan, YALE L. SCH.
104

SCHOLARSHIP

LEGAL

REPOSITORY

(2008),

http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4780&context-fss-papers.
105 Bryan Clark, "I Have Nothing to Hide" Is Killing the Privacy Argument, THENEXTWEB
(Feb. 11, 2016), https://thenextweb.com/opinion/2016/02/11/i-have-nothing-to-hide-is-killingthe-privacy-argument/.
106

Id.
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C. Company-ConsumerAlliances

Another significant inflection point for privacy and disclosure is the
relationship between commercial enterprises that have helped to stoke the gold
rush of information and the consumers who create the information. To minimize
incentives for companies to participate in the information marketplace and the
surveillance economy, privacy needs to be valued by consumers as a commodity
in its own right, much like organic foods have become a valued food type. If
interest convergence occurs, where company and consumer alignment in
interests will occur, even for different reasons, companies will see the value in
maintaining the privacy of their customers. This alignment will go a long way to
putting some brakes on the flow of information.
There are a variety of ways such an alignment might appear, particularly
if consumers are willing to pay for the safeguards. Consumers pay more for
organic labels, so perhaps consumers will eventually be willing to pay more for
enhanced privacy safeguards. Also, incentives might exist for increasing
anonymized information whenever possible. Companies would provide readily
understood privacy policies in an accessible place. Companies could disclose
with specificity what they actually do with the information, how long that
information is held, how it is safeguarded, and who has access to the information.
In addition, where and when companies use encryption, how a company deals
with government requests for information, whether a company sells the
information and if so, to whom, can all be helpful forms of accountability, and
elements of a newly constructed privacy norm. While it would be preferable if
these requirements were adopted as law, consumers can start showing companies
these aspects of privacy matter by indicating as such and showing that privacy is
valued with their pocketbooks.
VI. CONCLUSION

The massive production of self-surveillance information as a result of
the IoT has changed the face of privacy. The IoT has allowed for data transfers
to private companies and, in turn, to the government in unprecedented ways. The
IoT has created vast new sources of information through connective radio sensors
implanted in every part of a person's life. That information has become part of
the stream of commerce, allowing the government the opportunity to access the
information by buying it, grabbing it through an intelligence program, or
obtaining it through partnerships with private companies. Sources of selfsurveillance often underestimate what happens to their information. The sources
can miscalculate the importance of the information collected and IoT devices can
raise little fear precisely because the information flow is generally unseen.10 7
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There is little agreement about what needs to be done, if anything, to
safeguard the important personal and democratic value of privacy. Yet, several
forms of protection can be adopted to protect against the further dissipation of
privacy or its unregulated shapeshifting. Protective tools can emanate from
individuals, private companies, the state or federal government, and the Fourth
Amendment. While many commentators focus on changing the Fourth
Amendment's Third Party Doctrine to afford more protection to self-generated
data, even if that data is voluntarily disclosed in a limited fashion, other sources
of protection are available as well. The government can create greater
transparency through legislation, but in an age of terrorism and hacking, that is
not likely to occur. Instead, the most likely short-term protection of privacy will
result from the bottom-up, not the top-down-either from the marketplace with
the pragmatic concept of interest convergence, in that the interests of both
°8
consumers and companies will become aligned to promote privacy options as
privacy becomes a more valuable commodity to consumers, or from stronger
cultural norms that educate individuals to prioritize the protection of their own
privacy.

Businesses have other incentives to protect privacy of customers. Hackers are a threat to
their products, and those companies who encrypt transmissions and allow for password protection
from even the companies that make the products-as was illustrated by the Apple iPhone stalemate
with the U.S. Government after its attempt to get Apple to overcome a password protecting a
terrorist's phone-will better protect their standing in the marketplace.
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